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Fighting at the Command of God:
Reassessing the Borderline Case in Karl Barth’s Account of War in the Church 
Dogmatics
‘To the memory of one who faithfully fulfilled the office of teacher in the church’ 
is the dedication that begins John H. Yoder’s Karl Barth and the Problem of War, but in 
his extended interrogation of Barth’s attitude to warfare Yoder does not allow his respect 
to stand in the way of strong and impassioned critique. Yoder draws on personal 
conversations with Barth and transcriptions of Barth’s conversations with others in 
addition to Barth’s published writings, and there are passages where Yoder makes it clear 
he is responding to Barth’s comments on the draft of his manuscript. This makes the book 
an account of an interchange between two theologians, albeit reported by only one of 
them. 
Yoder’s account divides my sympathies: I troubled as he is by Barth’s description in 
Church Dogmatics III/4 of the exceptional case in which warfare is commanded by God, 
but I disagree with Yoder that the problems here are the result of a fundamental problem 
with Barth’s ethical method. In addition to recounting Yoder’s conversation with Barth, 
therefore, I will also in this essay enter the dialogue as a third participant, suggesting a 
resolution of the difficulties in Barth’s treatment of war with which neither of the other 
participants would wholly agree. 
It may seem surprising that Yoder was prepared to engage so comprehensively with 
a passage of the Church Dogmatics that Barth conceded ‘is perhaps not one of the most 
David Clough Fighting at the Command of God 2
felicitous’.1 The discussion is fruitful in spite of the infelicities of the text because, in 
addition to being novel and provocative, Barth’s account contains insights that go beyond 
the tired opposition of pacifism and Just War theory. Yoder is impressed by ‘the 
monumental body of theologically integrated Protestant ethical thought which [the 
twentieth] century has seen’.2 There are good reasons not to adopt the entirety of Barth’s 
view of the ethics of warfare as expressed in the Church Dogmatics, as the following 
pages will make clear. Engaging with his position, however, is enlightening in key areas 
and clarifies both the issues at stake and the options available for a theological assessment 
of war.
In the Dogmatics, Barth treats pacifism and warfare in volume III/4. He completed it
in 1951, and recent European history had given him ample opportunity both to 
[top of page 215]
reflect on the proper attitude of the Church to war, and to act on the result of his 
convictions. He vigorously supported the war against Hitler, and wrote to Christians in 
England, France, the United States, and elsewhere to urge them to do so.3 Barth discusses 
war under the heading of ‘The Protection of Life’, which he describes as the elucidation 
of the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’. All human life belongs to God, so respect and 
protection is demanded for it. The commandment to protect it, however, is has its horizon 
                                                     
1 Stimme der Gemeinde, 1963, 750 ff., cited by John H. Yoder, Karl Barth and the Problem of War
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 117 n.
2  Yoder, Karl Barth, 15.
3 Barth’s wartime letters are available in Karl Barth, Eine Schweitzer Stimme, 1938-1945 (Zollikon-Zurich: 
Evangelischer Verlag, 1945). Several are translated in Karl Barth, The Christian Cause (New York: Macmillan, 
1941). Busch’s biography (Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life From Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. 
John Bowden [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976]) gives an account of Barth’s activity in this period, and Will 
Herberg provides a short survey of a few of the letters in Will Herberg, ‘The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth’, 
introduction to Karl Barth, Community, State, and Church: Three Essays (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968), 
11-67. Yoder includes a critique of Herberg’s essay in John H. Yoder, Karl Barth and the Problem of War
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 119-131.
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in the will of God the Creator, so the protection of life is limited and not absolute. To 
think otherwise would be to treat human life as ‘a kind of second God’.4 Barth notes that 
the main theme of the section on the protection of life is the exceptional case (Grenzfall) 
where ‘the Lord of life may further its protection even in the strange form of its 
conclusion and termination’.5 He discusses the possibility of this Grenzfall in relation to 
suicide, abortion, euthanasia, killing in self-defence, capital punishment, and tyrannicide 
before turning to a consideration of killing in warfare.
Barth’s first words on warfare call for an unflinching realism about the nature of 
modern national conflict. He identifies three illusions that we can no longer entertain. 
First, there are no longer uncommitted spectators in a nation at war. All members of a
nation are now military personnel and therefore belligerents, directly or indirectly: no 
longer is war fought by small armies from the ‘military classes’. Second, it is now clear 
that the issue in modern warfare is economic power: ‘the struggle for coal, potash, ore, oil 
and rubber, for markets and communications, for more stable frontiers and spheres of 
influence as bases from which to deploy power for the acquisition of more power’. In the 
past, it was easier to believe that wars were fought for more noble motives, such as 
honour, justice, freedom, and other supreme values, but it is now difficult to believe this 
sincerely. The armaments industry, which its close links to science and industry 
‘imperiously demands that war should break out from time to time to use up existing 
stocks and create the demand for new ones’. Barth amends the Roman proverb ‘if you 
want peace, prepare for war’ to ‘if you do not want war, prepare for peace’, but claims 
that the way in which we are possessed by economic power means that neither of these is 
applicable. We want a form of war even in peacetime, so our mobilization for war, and 
                                                     
4 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (subsequently CD), vol. III/4, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance, trans. A. T. MacKay et al., (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 398 (Karl Barth, Kirchliche 
Dogmatik, vol. III/4 [Zurich: Theologischer Verlag Zurich, 1993], 453: page references to the English 
translation are followed by page references to the German edition in parentheses in all citations that follow).
5 CD III/4, 398 (454).
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the outbreak of war, are inevitable. The third illusion Barth identifies is that war requires 
anything other than ‘quite nakedly and brutally the killing of as many as possible of the 
men who make up the opposing forces’.6 Previously, it was easier to focus on the skill, 
courage, and readiness for self-sacrifice that war demanded of the individual, and to 
believe that the individual confronted by an individual enemy was in an unavoidable 
position of self-defence.
To-day, however, the increasing scientific objectivity of military killing, the 
development, appalling effectiveness and dreadful nature of the methods, 
instruments and machines employed, and the extension of the conflict to the 
civilian population, have made it quite clear that war does in fact mean no 
more and no less than killing, with neither glory, dignity nor chivalry, with 
neither restraint nor consideration in any respect…Much is already gained if 
only we do 
[top of page 216]
at last soberly admit that, whatever may be the purpose or possible justice of a 
war, it now means that, without disguise or shame, not only individuals or 
even armies, but whole nations are out to destroy one another by every 
possible means. It only needed the atom and hydrogen bomb to complete the 
self-disclosure of war in this regard.7
I interrupt Barth here to question whether the illusions he identified accurately 
characterize war as it is fought fifty years on. In relation to the first illusion, that there is a 
meaningful category of noncombatants, the evidence is mixed. Contemporary military 
techniques used by technologically advanced nations reduce the need for large-scale 
conscription, so there has been a movement back to smaller professional armies, but the 
recent increase in smaller scale wars, such as those in the Afghanistan, the former USSR 
and the former Yugoslavia, have made combatants of significant proportions of the 
                                                     
6 CD III/4, 452 (518).
7 CD III/4, 453 (518-9).
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population. The military-industrial complex continues to require the daily involvement of 
many citizens in preparations for wars by their own nation, or by others via the lucrative 
trade in armaments.8 In addition, the sizable proportion of tax revenues devoted to 
military spending by most governments involves all members of society in war 
preparations at a different level.9 Barth’s observations here are a useful reminder, then, of 
the involvement of the whole nation in preparing for and carrying out military operations. 
There is also a clear difficulty, however, in dismissing the distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants, traditionally known as the principle of discrimination in Just War 
theory: it removes a widely acknowledged—if less widely observed—check on the 
conduct of war. If war can be morally legitimate, as Barth will go on to claim, the absence 
of this principle would inevitably make it more destructive to a wider group of persons 
than it would be if the principle continued to be observed. While this point is rhetorically 
fruitful, then, spoken by the non-pacifist it is also morally irresponsible.
The second illusion about war from which Barth wishes to free us is that its motive 
is anything but the acquisition of economic power. Here, again, we have a useful 
reminder that the criterion of just cause in Just War theory is all too often a fig leaf barely 
covering the naked pursuit of national self-interest. Almost invariably, a purportedly just 
cause can be found to legitimize a war fought with baser intentions, and the difficulty of 
judging intentions from the outside make it difficult to gainsay such claims. We will 
make significant gains in realistic understanding of national motives if we accept that 
gaining economic power is very often the motive for war. This is not Barth’s point, 
however. Barth wants us to accept that there is no other motive but gain of economic 
power for war. Were this a face-to-face conversation, we could argue about whether 
                                                     
8  For example, in the UK 672 000 of my fellow citizens (4 % of the UK working population) are 
employed either by the Ministry of Defence, or in arms-related  industries (source: UK Defence Statistics 
2000, published by the Ministry of Defence, London).
9 For example, in 2001 the UK devoted over 6 % of its public expenditure to the military (source: 
Budget Report 2001, H M Treasury, London).
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motives for particular wars could be subsumed under this description. As I write in 
November 2001, the US is continuing its ‘War on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, and seems 
likely soon to carry out attacks in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan with apparent assent 
from the UK.10 Motives seem inextricably mixed here: most nations would accept the 
right of the US to use limited force in self-defence, yet given the scale and breadth of the 
US military aggression it is hard to escape the conclusion that its aims are much wider 
than this. It is not hard to find, however, to find examples of military actions where 
attributing 
[top of page 217]
economic gain as the sole motive is more implausible, such as the US military support of 
the UN distribution of famine relief in Somalia in 1992-3. Again, therefore, Barth’s 
attempt to disabuse us of the illusion that war can be fought for noble motives is a 
valuable reminder of the need for an hermeneutic of suspicion in assessing motives for 
going to war, but its force is weakened by overstatement.
Barth’s third illusion, that war is always total war, falls into a similar category. The 
refined objectivity of the methods used to kill has gone far beyond that of the 1950s, so 
that the act of initiating an attack that will kill and maim on a small or large scale can 
resemble participation in a video game. We have not yet thought through the implications 
of this for a theological assessment of war. Barth’s claim, however, that war is always 
nations set on the complete destruction of each other, is unconvincing. We have certainly 
seen recent examples of this kind of total war: the systematic rape of Bosnian and 
Croatian women in the early 1990s; the massacre of the Tutsi people in Rwanda in 1994. 
Yet there are also counter-examples: neither Argentina nor the UK was set on the 
                                                     
10  The Guardian, November 29th, 2001.
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complete destruction of the other in the war over the Falklands/Malvenas, and the US 
could have entirely destroyed the nation of Iraq at the end of the Gulf War, but did not. 
Barth’s third illusion is perhaps the least plausible of the three.
Having stated these reservations about the three illusions about war Barth identified, 
I will return to Barth’s contribution to the discussion. Following this blunt assessment of 
contemporary warfare, Barth states that the Grenzfall in relation to warfare must be stated 
with even stricter reserve than in the other cases of killing he considered previously. This 
is so for three reasons: first, war involves a whole nation in killing, making everyone 
responsible for whether this is commanded killing or forbidden murder; second, it 
involves killing those who are only enemies in the sense that they are fighting for their 
country; and third, war demands almost everything that God has forbidden be done by 
millions on a broad scale: ‘To kill effectively, and in connexion therewith, must not those 
who wage war steal, rob, commit arson, lie, deceive, slander, and unfortunately to a large 
extent fornicate, not to speak of the almost inevitable repression of all the finer and 
weightier forms of obedience?’11
All affirmative answers to the question of whether war can be commanded by God 
‘are wrong if they do not start with the assumption that the inflexible negative of pacifism 
has almost infinite arguments in its favour and is almost overpoweringly strong’.12 Barth 
agrees with those who lament the Church’s change of political theology after Constantine:
‘in a kind of panic at all costs to give the emperor or other ruler his due there has been a 
complete surrender of the wholesome detachment from this imperial or national 
undertaking which the early Church had been able in its own way and for good reasons to 
maintain’.13 For Barth the mistake here is in eschatology: the Church’s justification of 
war is an indication that ‘the realities and laws of this passing aeon…have come to be 
                                                     
11 CD III/4, 454 (519-20).
12 CD III/4, 455 (520).
13 CD III/4, 456 (521).
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rated more highly than the passing of this world and the coming of the Lord. The criterion 
has thus been 
[top of page 218]
lost without the application of which there can be no controlling Christian will and action 
within this passing aeon’. We have lost a sense of the ‘unheard-of and extraordinary’ idea 
of killing for the state: the primary task of Christian ethics in this context is ‘to recover 
and manifest a distinctive horror of war and aloofness from it’.14
The exercise of power is an opus alienum for the state, Barth claims: the state 
possesses power and is able to exercise it, but Christian ethics must always challenge the 
state with the question of whether the exercise of power is necessary.  The normal task of 
the state is ‘to fashion peace in such a way that life is served and war kept at bay’:15 it is 
when a state does not pursue this normal task that it is compelled to take up the abnormal 
task of war. It ‘requires no great faith, insight nor courage’ to condemn war absolutely, or 
to ‘howl with the wolves that unfortunately war belongs no less to the present world 
order, historical life and the nature of the state than does peace’.
What does require Christian faith, insight and courage—and the Christian 
Church and Christian ethics are there to show them—is to tell nations and 
governments that peace is the real emergency to which all our time, powers 
and ability must be devoted from the very outset in order that men may live 
and live properly, so that no refuge need be sought in war, nor need there be 
expected in it what peace has denied. Pacifists and militarists are usually 
agreed in the fact that for them the fashioning of peace as the fashioning of the 
state for democracy, and of democracy for social democracy, is a secondary 
                                                     
14 CD III/4, 456 (521-2).
15 CD III/4, 456 (524).
David Clough Fighting at the Command of God 9
concern as compared with rearmament or disarmament. It is for this reason 
that Christian ethics must be opposed to both.16
Barth suggests that ‘the cogent element of truth in the pacifist position’ will benefit if it is 
not presented as the total truth ‘but is deliberately qualified, perhaps at the expense of 
logical consistency’. The consistency of theological ethics ‘may for once differ from that 
of logic’.17
Yoder objects, as we will see, to the concept of the Grenzfall in Barth’s ethics, but 
up to this point he has been sympathetic to the substance of Barth’s discussion of war. 
When Barth turns to his critique of pacifism, however, Yoder is compelled to speak. He 
applauds Barth for taking a position ‘very near that of Christian pacifism…nearer in fact 
than of any really prominent theologian in the history of European Protestant 
dogmatics’,18 but notes that Barth has little understanding of the pacifist position he all 
but endorses. Yoder suggests that Barth’s knowledge of Christian pacifism when he wrote 
Church Dogmatics III/4 was restricted to the writings of Leo Tolstoy, acquaintance with 
the school of Leonhard Ragaz, and one book by G. J. Deering. Barth seems to believe, 
Yoder says, that the pacifist he opposes is a legalist, believes the state should immediately 
abandon violence, is not specifically Christian in his position, and takes principles from 
the Decalogue or the Sermon on the Mount as exceptionless norms. Yoder disclaims this 
‘absolutist’ pacifism and claims that his dispute with Barth
[top of page 219]
is therefore not a debate between pacifism and militarism, nor even between 
pacifism and non-pacifism. It is rather a debate to be carried on within the 
pacifist camp, between one position which is pacifist in all the general 
statements it can make but announces in advance that it is willing to make 
                                                     
16 CD III/4, 459 (525-6).
17 CD III/4, 461 (527).
18  Yoder, Karl Barth, 19.
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major exceptions, and another position, nearly the same in theory, which is 
not able to affirm in advance the possibility of the exceptional case.19
After this interjection from Yoder, we will follow Barth a little further. After 
describing the horror of war, and the Church’s responsibility for building peace, Barth 
moves on to describe the Grenzfall in which war may be commanded by God. The first 
criterion he provides to identify this possibility is that the existence or autonomy of a state 
must be attacked, so that a nation finds itself forced to choose to surrender or assert itself. 
Barth then asks why this possibility should be allowed, and responds ‘that there may well 
be bound up with the independent life of a nation the responsibility for the whole 
physical, intellectual and spiritual life of the people comprising it, and therefore their 
relationship to God’. He continues:
It may well be that they are forbidden by God to renounce the independent 
status of their nation, and that they must therefore defend it without 
considering either their own lives or the lives of those who threaten it. 
Christian ethics cannot possibly deny that this case may sometimes occur. The 
divine command itself posits and presents it as a case of extreme urgency.
In a surprising single sentence small-print paragraph, Barth adds
I may remark in passing that I myself should see it as such a case if there were 
any attack on the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Swiss 
Confederation, and I should speak and act accordingly.20
Barth makes three further brief points about this exceptional case in the three pages he 
devotes to it. First, he suggests that a nation may be called to go to war to help a weaker 
neighbour, as well as if its own existence is threatened. Second, he recognizes that if a 
state is to be ready to go to war in these cases, it must prepare itself to do so even in 
peacetime, and arm itself accordingly. Third, Barth claims that the ‘distinctively Christian 
note in the acceptance of this demand is that it is quite unconditional. That is to say, it is 
independent of the success or failure of the enterprise, and therefore of the strength of 
                                                     
19  Yoder, Karl Barth, 51-3.
20 CD III/4, 462 (528-9).
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one’s own forces in comparison with those of the enemy’. If war ‘is ventured in 
obedience and therefore with a good conscience, it is also ventured in faith and therefore 
with joyous and reckless determination’.21
I cannot help interrupting Barth here. This passage makes clear the distance between 
Barth and the Just War tradition. Barth dispenses with the criterion of probable success in 
Just War theory, which states that you must be likely to succeed in your objective for 
going to war. If observed, this principle reduces bloodshed by avoiding conflicts that are 
fruitless, which accords with overall aims of Just War theory: to reduce the number of 
wars and the damage done by them. These laudable and humane objectives are vital if the 
legitimacy of war is to be affirmed in a Christian context, and for Barth to set them aside 
puts the wars he foresees as 
[top of page 220]
permissible exceptional cases into the category of holy wars, or crusades, rather than just 
wars. Christians must either reject war, or help to win support for principles that 
minimize the damage it does. Barth does neither here.
Barth’s final word on the subject of war in this volume is in relation to 
conscientious objection: he supports conscientious objection so long as it is in relation to 
particular wars, rather than absolute, and calls on the Church to guide individuals in these 
decisions, which may require the Church to counsel individuals not to fight for the state:
In doing so, it might have to accept the odium of unreliability in the eyes of 
the government or majority. In certain cases, it might have to be prepared to 
face threats or suffering, bearing for its part the total risk of this kind of 
revolutionary loyalty. But there have been prophets before, and where does the 
Church learn that it is absolved from facing the same risk?22
                                                     
21 CD III/4, 463 (530).
22 CD III/4, 4649 (539).
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Yoder notes in relation to this passage the implication that
since the necessary war is very rare and cannot in fact be seen and decided 
upon in advance, the church should always be ready to enter corporately the 
ranks of the opposition, expressing here faithfulness to what the state should 
be though her insubordination to what the state is.23
Having attended carefully to Barth’s position, with only infrequent interruptions, let 
us now listen to Yoder. His central contention is that Barth’s use of the category of 
Grenzfall is mistaken, and the mistake is particularly evident in the ‘non-Barthian’ way 
Barth uses extra-biblical categories to resolve the question of whether war could be 
commanded by God. Yoder questions the need for the attention Barth gives to 
exceptional cases in ethics: ‘Why should it not be possible for a general statement in 
Christian ethics to have the same validity as a general statement within some other realm 
of Christian dogmatics?’24 The concept of the Grenzfall means Barth expects exceptions 
in advance; the Grenzfall ‘does not emerge unpredicted at a point where concrete 
problems turn out on inspection to be otherwise insoluble; the concrete cases are, rather, 
found to fit the place prepared for them by the systematic exposition’.25 Barth is wrong 
that pacifists are less free to obey God: ‘the pacifist who in his ethics claims to be bound 
to the general line of God’s revelation without being able or authorized to predict 
exceptions is no less free for obedience than the theologian who in dogmatics is also 
bound to the general line of God’s revelation in an affirmation about the nature of Christ 
or about the essence of the Church’.26 Yoder asserts that if human finitude means it is 
impossible to affirm with complete certainty that God has always forbidden all killing, it 
                                                     
23  Yoder, Karl Barth, 45.
24 Yoder, Karl Barth, 61.
25 Yoder, Karl Barth, 65.
26 Yoder, Karl Barth, 62.
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must be even less possible to affirm that there are places where God will affirm killing.27
This leads him to his strongest charge against Barth:
the Grenzfall is not a formal concept with validity in the discipline of ethics. It 
is simply the label which Barth has seen fit to attach to the fact that, in some 
[top of page 221]
situations, he considers himself obliged to make a choice which runs against 
what all the formal concepts of his own ethics would seem to require. Barth 
has not constructed in the Grenzfall a reliable method of theological ethics in 
which it would be possible to found either logically or with relation to the 
revelation of God in Christ the advocacy of certain deviant ways of acting, 
such as killing when killing is otherwise forbidden. He has simply found a 
name for the fact that in certain contexts he is convinced of the necessity of 
not acting according to the way God seems to have spoken in Christ.28
Yoder substantiates this charge in his consideration of Barth’s delimitation of the 
exceptional case of warfare commanded by God. Barth’s claim that a nation may be 
commanded to fight to ensure its survival is very surprising to Yoder. It reintroduces the 
idea of a Volk, with an independent moral value and a special relationship to God, which 
Barth rejected decisively earlier in the Dogmatics.29 Yoder argues that the consequences 
of admitting the possibility of warfare are disproportionate to its status as an exceptional 
case. In particular, ‘to say that the state should be constantly prepared for war is like 
saying that an honest man should always be prepared for lying or a faithful husband for 
divorce; it confuses an extreme eventuality with normality, thus demonstrating the 
                                                     
27 Yoder, Karl Barth, 72-3.
28 Yoder, Karl Barth, 73.
29 Yoder, Karl Barth, 80. Barth wrote ‘In this connexion we must consider one of the most curious 
and tragic events in the whole history of Protestant theology. It took place in Germany in the years between 
the two world wars. I refer to the novel elevation on a wide front, if with varying emphases, of the term 
‘people’ to the front rank of theological and ethical concepts, and the underlying assertion and teaching that 
in the national determination of man we have an order of creation no less than in the relationship of man 
and woman and parents and children’ CD 305 (345).
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inadequacy of the Grenzfall as a tool for straight thinking’.30 Respect for life itself, Yoder 
argues, is a philosophical abstraction from the biblical texts, which Barth then uses to 
justify the destruction of life.31
Yoder’s conclusion is that ‘between Barth and an integral Christian pacifism the 
only differences lie at points where Barth did not finish working out the implications of 
his originality’.32 Widening the discussion, he draws on two pieces of evidence to support 
his view. First, in volume IV/2 of the Dogmatics, Barth briefly revisits the topic of the use 
of force in his consideration of Jesus’ directions to his disciples. Here he observes that 
Jesus attests to the kingdom of God ‘as the end of the fixed idea of the necessity and 
beneficial value of force’. The kingdom ‘invalidates the whole friend-foe relationship’ in 
its call for love of the enemy. There can be no question of a general rule here, but
for the one whom Jesus, in His call to discipleship, places under this particular 
command and prohibition, there is a concrete and incontestable direction 
which has to be carried out exactly as given. In conformity with the New 
Testament one cannot be pacifist in principle, only practically. But let 
everyone give heed whether, being called to discipleship, it is either possible 
for him to avoid, or permissible for him to neglect becoming practically 
pacifist!33
The second piece of evidence that Barth might have revised his treatment of warfare in 
III/4 is from a comment Barth made in 1962 concerning it, to which I have already 
referred: ‘Of course that was all written in 1951…I cannot yet completely reject it even 
now. Nevertheless I would say, that it is perhaps not one of the most felicitous passages 
in the Kirchliche Dogmatik…I first spoke 99 percent against war and the 
[top of page 222]
                                                     
30  Yoder, Karl Barth, 107.
31 Yoder, Karl Barth, 112.
32 Yoder, Karl Barth, 118.
33 CD IV/2, 530 (622), incorporating Yoder’s revised translation (Yoder, Karl Barth, 116-7).
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military. I hope this impressed you!’ In the same interview, he condemned the 
mischievous use of the text by some German politicians to prove the possibility of a 
modern just war.34
Now that I have recounted the substance of the discussion between Barth and 
Yoder, I will enter the conversation more directly to offer my own assessment of the 
position we have reached, and a suggestion for a way forward. There are two aspects to 
Yoder’s criticism of Barth here: first, a general criticism of the structure of Barth’s ethics, 
centred on the concept of Grenzfall, and, second, a specific criticism of Barth’s 
discussion of warfare. I agree with the specific criticism, but dispute the general one. 
Barth’s use of the Grenzfall here is different from the way he uses it in discussing other 
cases of the protection of life. In each of the accounts of suicide, abortion, euthanasia, 
killing in self-defence, capital punishment, and tyrannicide, Barth emphasizes the reasons 
why the command of God will almost always require the protection of life, but he finally 
allows the possibility of rare exceptions. The openness to these borderline cases does not 
threaten the line of argument up to that point, and Barth does not call for deliberate 
preparation for the exceptional case. Yet in the case of war, the Grenzfall overturns and 
negates Barth’s argument that in 99 per cent of cases the command of God forbids 
warfare.
Comparison with Barth’s treatment of killing in self-defence is particularly 
instructive. Barth argues that self-defence is ‘almost entirely excluded’ by Pauline texts 
and the Sermon on the Mount. The latter puts the attacker in the same category as the 
beggar and the person who seeks a loan. Self-defence may be natural, but is forbidden to 
the Christian except in rare cases. Where Christians have been ‘strictly disciplined’, 
‘thoroughly disarmed’, and ‘clearly pointed to peace’ it is then possible that they may 
                                                     
34  Stimme der Gemeinde, 1963, 750 ff., cited and translated by Yoder, Karl Barth, 117 n.
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hear the exceptional command to defend a third party or themselves.35 If we were to 
follow the pattern of Barth’s discussion of warfare, we would then go on to spell out the 
consequences of this exceptional case. If we are to be free to defend others and ourselves 
when we receive the Grenzfall command here, then we must be appropriately prepared. 
Training in self-defence will clearly be required, and our readiness for self-defence would
be further enhanced if we ensure that we are armed at all times and regularly devote time 
to training in the use of firearms. Barth does not follow this path in the case of killing in 
self-defence because it is so obviously counter-productive. The command of God will 
almost always be to refrain from self-defence, so the preparation we require is to learn 
how to keep ourselves from following our instincts to strike back and how to resolve 
conflicts peacefully. Spending time in self-defence training and always carrying a firearm 
to be ready for the exceptional case where a forceful response is commanded by God 
would make it difficult or impossible to retain a commitment to not resisting one’s 
attacker. Careful preparation for the exceptional case guarantees that it will be 
unexceptional.
This example is unfortunately not the caricature it seems to be. Barth’s treatment of 
the Grenzfall case in discussing warfare is exactly analogous to training and carrying 
[top of page 223]
weapons for personal self-defence. He rejects retaining standing armies as a national 
policy, but requires preparation for war in peacetime if a country has decided only to go 
to war when commanded by God in an emergency.36 This is in spite of Barth’s earlier 
harsh criticism of national preparations for war in peacetime and its connection with the 
                                                     
35 CD III/4, 427-37 (488-499).
36 Switzerland required and still requires national service of all its male citizens, currently between 
the ages of 20 and 42. During this time regular training in the use of firearms is required, and arms are kept 
in the home.
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military-industrial complex, and his statement that the task of the Christian Church and 
Christian ethics ‘is to tell nations and governments that peace is the real emergency to 
which all our time, powers and ability must be devoted from the very outset’.37 We 
cannot devote all our powers to the emergency of peace, and at the same time devote 
some of our powers to making sure we are in a position to win a war if peace fails. The 
great economic and human resources such preparations for war demand is one of the most 
powerful arguments in favour of a national policy of pacifism. According to Barth’s 
discussion, the exceptional case in which we are called to war implies an exceptionless 
norm that requires us to expend substantial resources on war preparations. Yoder’s 
comparison with an honest person preparing to lie, or a faithful spouse for divorce—or, 
better, infidelity—is precisely to the point. Barth’s treatment of the exceptional case here 
overturns and renders irrelevant the 99 per cent he intended to speak against war and the 
military. His recommendation of routine preparation for war means that Barth cannot 
support his contention that war is an opus alienum of the state: it has clearly become the
opus proprium he rejected.38
One way of resolving these difficulties in Barth’s account of war would be to work 
back from this de facto acceptance of war preparations and weaken his earlier 
commitment to the insights of pacifism and the importance of preparations for peace. 
This option would clearly be against the major line of argument of this passage. Only 3 of 
the 20 pages on war in the English translation of Church Dogmatics III/4 are devoted to 
explicating the exceptional case: the other 17 emphasize the horror of war, the importance 
of building institutions for peace, and the role of conscientious objection.39 The 
                                                     
37 CD III/4, 459 (525).
38  See Yoder, Karl Barth, 106: ‘Is is realistic, in terms of social psychology and in the light of the 
experience of highly armed nations, and is it straightforward use of language to retain such phrases as 
ultima ratio and opus alienum when readiness for war is thus organized?’
39  While I am in strong agreement with Yoder that Barth’s treatment of the exceptional case 
undermines his statements against war, Yoder is inaccurate in claiming that ‘Barth uses almost as much 
space defending, defining, and demonstrating the necessity of the extreme case as he does in drawing 
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recommendation of practical pacifism in Church Dogmatics IV/2 and the interview Yoder 
cites from Stimme provide further evidence against this line of interpretation. As I have 
suggested above, to permit warfare while dismissing noncombatant immunity and the 
criterion of probable success is irresponsible. Thus the only coherent move to make in 
this direction is to adopt Just War theory, which cannot be reconciled with Barth’s 
position that pacifism has almost infinite arguments in its favour.
A second alternative in interpreting Barth here is that offered by Yoder: reject the 
concept of Grenzfall and embrace the exceptionless ethical demand of pacifism. This 
option is counter to Barth’s deepest metaethical commitments. All ethical absolutism is 
idolatrous, according to Barth: Christians must be obediently open to whatever God’s 
command may require of them. Yoder bridles at being labelled an absolutist (see above), 
but the nub of his difference with Barth is that he does not share Barth’s concern that 
rigid ethical system can interfere with attentive listening to God’s command. Abandoning 
the idea that God might call us to something new would solve the difficulty with Barth’s 
account of war, but at the cost of the greater part of his view of the relationship between 
theology and ethics.
[top of page 224]
The difficulty I have identified with Barth’s account of war in the Dogmatics is not with 
his treatment of pacifism, or the structure of his metaethics, but with his treatment of the 
exceptional case in relation to warfare. A more promising way of overcoming the 
difficulty addresses this issue directly. Barth must allow the possibility of the use of force 
in response to God’s command, but he need not treat this possible scenario as he does. 
Returning to the example of self-defence, we have seen that Barth allows that self-
                                                                                                                                                                          
clearly the main line of his arguments’ (Yoder, Karl Barth, 103). Given that Barth wished to delimit an 
exceptional case, the problem is rather the brevity of his description of it.
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defence may be commanded in the Grenzfall case, but he does not recommend 
preparations for this eventuality. In the context of warfare, Barth stipulates that the 
exception is harder to justify because of the scale of the evil war creates, which means 
that preparations in this case would be for a possibility even rarer than self-defence. If we 
add to this that Barth considers that in peacetime we must devote all our energy to 
peacemaking, and that preparation for war demands substantial human and economic 
resources, we have a persuasive case that Christians cannot support preparations for the 
exceptional case in which they may be called upon to go to war: they are too busy with 
the emergency of peace to prepare for the distant and unlikely prospect of war, and know 
that war preparations are incompatible with serious attempts to build a peaceful order. 
This means there is no mandate to prepare for war. There remains the almost unthinkable 
possibility that God will call Christians to engage in large scale killing of their fellows, 
but this Grenzfall case no longer transforms the rest of the existence of the Christian. It is 
true that a nation governed on this basis will be less likely to succeed in war if it is ever 
called upon to fight, but the Christian vocation is to peacemaking, not to amassing state-
of-the-art tools for killing and destruction, and consigning a significant section of society 
to manufacturing these armaments or to full-time training in using them without qualms. 
This development of Barth’s position results in a consistent account in which his view of 
the nature of modern warfare and the insights of pacifism are respected, and the Grenzfall
case is restored to its position at the fringe, rather than the centre, of his thought. The 
interpretation is in accordance with his suggestion of a position of ‘practical pacifism’ in 
Church Dogmatics IV/2, and with the evidence from the Stimme interview that he 
intended to write 99 per cent against war and the military. It also facilitates the task Barth 
assigns to Christian ethics here: ‘to recover and manifest a distinctive horror of war and 
aloofness from it’.40
                                                     
40 CD III/4, 456 (521-2).
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The reinterpretation of Barth’s treatment of the Grenzfall case in relation to warfare 
is important because it allows us to hear both his bleak analysis of the reality of modern 
warfare and his call to the Church to address the emergency of peace without being 
distracted by his strange account of the borderline case. We do well to pay attention to his 
reminder that all members of society are complicit in military preparations, that the real 
issue in warfare is frequently economic power, and that our possession by economic 
power in the shape of the military-industrial complex demands our continuous 
preparation for war. In particular, we need to reflect further on the meaning of the 
Christian vocation to be peacemakers, which Barth characterizes as telling ‘nations and 
governments that peace is the real emergency to which all our time, powers and ability 
must be devoted from the very outset’.41
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This is a strong and counter-cultural message at a time when the dominant strain of the 
churches’ contribution to the debate on the legitimacy of wars is a continual sober 
blessing of national military actions and the preparations that precede them. Barth 
challenges us to imagine a world in which we devote resources to serious efforts at peace-
making: the £30 billion spent on the Kosovo/a war gives some sense of the possibilities 
here.42 He also helps us see beyond this extraordinary scale of expense to the immense 
and demonic economic forces that lead us to accept it. Such powers and interests will not 
be easily defeated, but the development of Barth’s account of war in the Dogmatics I 
propose helps us to see clearly that the role of the Church is to prophesy against them, and 
to call nations to recognize the constant emergency of peace.
                                                     
41 CD III/4, 459 (525-6).
42
  ‘Bill for Kosovo war goes over £30bn’, Guardian 15th October, 1999, citing the BBC and Jane’s 
Defence Weekly as sources.
